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Abstract
Myerson [16] first introduced graph-restricted games in order to model
the interaction of cooperative players with an underlying communication
network. A dedicated solution concept—the Myerson value—is perhaps
the most important normative solution concept for cooperative games on
graphs. Unfortunately, its computation is computationally challenging.
In particular, although exact algorithms have been proposed [20], they
must traverse all connected coalitions of the graph of which there may be
exponentially many.
In this paper, we consider the issue of approximating the Myerson
value for arbitrary graphs and characteristic functions. While Monte Carlo
approximations have been proposed for the related concept of the Shap-
ley value [3, 6, 10], their suitability for the Myerson value has not been
studied. Given this, we evaluate and compare (both theoretically and
empiraclly) three Monte Carlo sampling methods for the Myerson value:
conventional method of sampling permutations; a new, hybrid algorithm
that combines exact computations and sampling; and sampling of con-
nected coalitions. We find that our hybrid algorithm performs very well
and also significantly improves on the conventional methods.
1 Introduction
In various cooperative settings, the assumption that all players can cooperate
seems unnatural. For instance, agents in multi-agent system may have limited
communication capabilities that naturally restrict coalitions that they are able
to join. They may also exist various other tangible or intangible constrains such
as negative experience, distrust, lack of social relationship or simply geograph-
ical distance.
To model such situation, Myerson [16] introduced graph-restricted games
in which it is assumed that only connected players can cooperate. Although
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2 PRELIMINARIES 2
players in a coalition do not have to be directly connected to communicate,
there must exist a path between them using only nodes in the coalition. In
essence, the value of a disconnected coalition becomes the sum of the values
of its connected components. Moreover, Myerson introduced a payoff division
scheme, now called the Myerson value, which he uniquely defined by a set of two
desirable axioms. It is the equivalent of the well-known concept of the Shapley
value [18] in graph-restricted games and it has various application. In particular,
it is one of the key concepts in the literature on game-theoretic centrality in
networks [8, 24, 12, 26, 21] (with applications, for instance, to covert networks
[13, 15], weighted voting gamaes [22, 25] or measuring social capital [14]).
The state-of-the-art algorithm to compute the Myerson value is due to Skib-
ski et al. [23]. However, it traverses all connected coalitions of the graph of which
there may be exponentially many. Thus, exact computations are infeasible in
many fields of interest, such as social network analysis (where various methods
are based on the Myerson value [8]). As for approximate algorithms, the Monte
Carlo sampling methods have been studied for the Shapley value [3, 6, 10] in
conventional coalitional games. However, their suitability for the Myerson value
has not been established.
Against this background, in this paper, we consider the issue of approx-
imating the Myerson value for arbitrary graphs and characteristic functions.
Algorithm 1 is a variation on a well-known sampling method for the Shapley
value. Our new, hybrid Algorithm 2 combines both exact computations and
sampling. Our algorithm 3 samples coalitions, but only performs calculations
for connected ones. We analyse all three algorithms empirically and establish
probably-approximately correct bounds on the number of necessary samples. It
turns out that our Algorithm 2 achieves the best results and even improves on
the literature for approximating the Shapley value.
2 Preliminaries
We will begin by introducing some concepts that will be necessary for the rest
of the paper. We begin with the graph theoretic concepts, and then move on to
cooperative game theory.
Graph Theory: For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that a network
is an undirected graph. A graph, G = (V,E), consists of a set of nodes, V , and
a set of edges, E ⊆ V × V . Since we are concerned with undirected graphs,
we will assume that if (u, v) ∈ E, then (v, u) ∈ E. Let V ′ ⊆ V . We will
say that G(V ′) is the subgraph of G induced by the set of nodes V ′ if and
only if G(V ′) = (V ′, E′) such that E′ = E ∩ V ′ × V ′. A path between the
nodes v1 and vk is an ordered set of nodes (v1, v2, . . . , vk) such that for all
1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 we have (vi, vi+1) ∈ E. We say that a graph is connected if
for all pairs of nodes s, t ∈ V there exists a path between them. By C(G) we
denote the set of connected components of the graph G. That is, C(G) = {V ′ :
V ′ ⊆ V,G(V ′) is connected,∀v∈VG(V ′ ∪ {v}) is not connected }. By K(V ′) =
C(G(V ′)) we denote the set of connected components of the graph induced by
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V ′ ⊆ V . Finally, by N(v) = {u : (v, u) ∈ E} we denote the set of neighbours of
v ∈ V and by N(V ′) = {u : ∃v∈V ′(v, u) ∈ E and u 6∈ C} the set of neighbours
of V ′ ⊆ V .
Cooperative Game Theory: A cooperative game consists of a set of players,
P , and a characteristic function, ν : 2P → R, where ν(∅) = 0. In other words, a
cooperative game consists of players and a valuation function of all the coalitions
(i.e., subsets) of the set of players. If C ⊂ P and i 6∈ C, then by MC(C, i) =
ν(C ∪ {i}) − ν(C) we will denote the marginal contribution of player i to the
coalition C. We will now introduce a few common types of games from the
literature (for example, they can be found in [19]):
• Super-additive: ν is superadditive if and only if for any S, T ⊆ V such
that S ∩ T = ∅, we have ν(S ∪ T ) ≥ ν(S) + ν(T ). That is, the union of
any two disjoint coalitions is worth at least as much as the sum of their
values.
• Submodular: ν is submodular if and only if ν(S ∪ T ) + ν(S ∩ T ) ≤
ν(S)+ν(T ). This intuitively captures the inverse of the snowballing effect:
it is less and less worthwile to join larger coalitions.
• Symmetric: ν is symmetric if it only depends on the size of the coalition.
In other words, ν(C) = f(|C|) for some f : N→ R.
Given this setting, a fundamental question is that—assuming that the grand
coalition (i.e., coalition of all the players) forms—how do we divide the value of
the coalition among its members? Such methods of handing out the payoffs to
players are referred to as payoff division schemes or values of the game. Shapley
[17] famously introduced a value, now known as the Shapley value, as one such
division scheme.
• Efficiency—The whole value of the grand coalition is distributed. In
other words
∑
i∈P SVi(ν) = ν(P ).
• Symmetry—The payoffs of agents do not depend on their identity.
• Null Player—A player who does not contribute to any coalition will
have no payoff. For any player i, if for all C we have MC(C, i) = 0, then
SVi(ν) = 0.
• Additivity—For any two games with the same agent set, (P, ν1) and
(P, ν2), the payoff from the sum of the two games will be the sum of payoffs
from each game separately. That is, SVi((ν1 + ν2)) = SVi(ν1) + SVi(ν2)
where (ν1 + ν2)(C) is equal to (ν1(C) + ν2(C)).
Shapley also showed that the axioms are equivalent to the following formula:
SVi(ν) =
∑
pi∈Π(P )
MC(Cpi(i), i)
|P |! , (1)
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where SVi(ν) denotes the Shapley value of player i in the game with character-
istic function ν, Π(P ) is the set of permutations of the set P and Cpi(i) is the
set of all players preceding i in the permutation pi. This is also equivalent to
the following:
SVi(ν) =
∑
C∈(P\{i}
|C|!(|P | − |C| − 1)!
|P |! MC(C, i). (2)
The Shapley value is the unique division scheme that satisfies not only the one
above but also other various intuitive axiomatizations (see the recent work by
Maschler et al. [11] for a sample overview).
Combining Networks and Cooperative Games: In this paper, we are
focused on a model due to Myerson that combines both a network setting and
a cooperative game. The model consists of a network, and a cooperative game
on the set of nodes (G = (V,E), ν : 2V → R). Myerson’s reasoning was that
players who are not connected should not be allowed to cooperate. Therefore,
the value of a coalition that is disconnected should be the sum of its connected
components.1 In other words, Myerson introduced graph-restricted games, i.e.,
the procedure of restricting games according to some graph structure. We will
denote the characteristic function ν, when it is restricted by the graph G, as
νG:
νG(C) =
∑
K∈K(C)
ν(C) (3)
Most importantly, Myerson introduced the Myerson value as a division scheme
for this setting. We will denote the Myerson value of node v in graph G with
characteristic function ν by MVv(G; ν). The Myerson value is the unique payoff
division scheme that satisfies the following two axioms:
• Efficiency in Connected Components: The whole value of the grand
coalition according to the restricted function is distributed. In effect, we
assume that the coalitions of connected components have formed, rather
than the grand coalition. Formally,
∑
v∈V MVv(ν) = sumC∈C(G)ν(C)
• Fairness: If we add an edge, (s, t), to G (denoted by G∪ (s, t)), then the
Myerson value of nodes s and t changes by the same amount. Formally:
MVs(G ∪ (s, t); ν)−MVs(G; ν) = MVt(G ∪ (s, t); ν)−MVt(G; ν).
Myerson showed, that the value he defined is equivalent to the Shapley value of
the graph-restricted game:
MVv(G; ν) = SVv(νG). (4)
In the next section, we consider the issue of approximating the Myerson
value.
1There also exist other methods of restricting cooperative games. For example, the value
of a disconnected coalition can be set equal to zero.
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3 Approximation Algorithms
In this section, we present three algorithms for approximating the Myerson
value. All of them rely on Monte Carlo sampling. In essence, we rewrite the
Myerson value as an average of a certain set of values that are based on the
marginal contributions of players. Next, we approximate MVi by sampling
certain elements from this set, and taking the average of the samples. Such
computational techniques are necessary, since the best algorithms for computing
the Myerson value exactly must iterate over all connected subgraphs of a graph,
of which there may be exponentially many. This makes exact computation
infeasible for many networks even when they are of moderate size.
Sampling Permutations: Algorithm 1 is a variation on the well known Monte
Carlo sampling of permutations for the Shapley value. The key idea is that the
Shapley value is an average of the marginal contributions of a player to all per-
mutations (Equation 1). Sampling permutations, then, we can take the average
of our samples in order to estimate the Shapley value. That is, for m sam-
ples, our estimate of the Shapley value will be ŜV i(ν) =
1
m
∑m
i=1MC(Cpi(i), i),
where pi is a random variable representing a random permutation of the set V
with a uniform probability distribution. Since the Myerson value of ν is simply
the Shapley value of νG, we can use the same method for estimating SVi(νG).
Line 4 is the main loop of the algorithm, where samples are drawn and
added to the estimate. Note that we do not explicitly sample permutations,
but instead directly sample the set Cpi(i)). Sampling coalition size with uniform
probability (line 6), and then a coalition of that size with uniform probability
(line 7) mimics sampling permutations. This has the added advantage that
sampling coalitions is computationally simpler. Moreover, the algorithm can be
easily modified for computing any semivalue2 by modifying the distribution in
line 5.
Line 2 and 8 may seem unintuitive, but are necessary in order to use a sample
not for just one, but for all nodes. Were we sampling for just one node, v, we
could sample from the set V \ v (since a node can only make a contribution
to a set of which it is not a part). What we do instead, is sample from a set
that is missing one node, s, and then decide which node that is afterwards by
swapping the v with s. This is done in line 8, where Sv↔s is the set of elements
from S with the difference that if v ∈ S, then v 6∈ Sv↔s and s ∈ Sv↔s (i.e. the
elements are swapped). If s = v, we assume S = Sv↔s. Finally, in line 10 we
add the marginal contribution, and in line 12 take the average over all marginal
contributions.
Hybrid Algorithm: The idea behind our new, hybrid Algorithm 2, is to
perform exact computations for permutations, where the node v is near the
beginning or the end of the permutation. In particular, we will consider exact
calculations when k ≤ pi(i) or pi(i) ≤ |V |−k. This is motivated by the fact that
for any j, there is the same number of coalitions of size j as there is of size |V |−j.
For example when k = 0, we consider when i is the first or the last element in
2This is beyond the scope of this article. For an overview on semivalues see [5]
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Algorithm 1: Sampling permutations for computing the Myerson value
Input: Graph: G = (V,E), Function: ν : C(G)→ R, Number Samples:
m
1 MV ← array of size |V | filled with 0;
2 s← arbitrary node in V ;
3 for i← 1 to m do
4 //sample an integer from the set [0, |V | − 1] with uniform probability;
5 k ← UNIFORM DIST (0, |V | − 1);
6 S ← random coalition of size k from the set V \ s;
7 for v ∈ V do
8 C ← Sv↔s;
9 MV [v]←MV [v] + νG(C ∪ {v})− νG(C);
10 for v ∈ V do
11 MV [v]← MV [v]m ;
12 Output: MV ;
any permutation. Note that there are 2(|V | − 1)! such permutations, but only
two coalitions to which i makes a contribution: ∅, or V \ {i}. Similarly, there
are
(|V |
k
)
=
( |V |
|V |−k
)
coalitions to which i makes a contribution, when pi(i) = k
or pi(i) = |V | − k. We will use this fact in order to simplify computation. We
will discuss the advantage of this approach in Section 4.
We will now rewrite Equation 1 according to the position of player i and
combine this with 2 for the exact computations:
SVi =
∑
C∈(V \{i})
|C|≤k or |C|≥|V |−k−1
|C|!(|V | − |C| − 1)!
|V |! MC(Cpi(i), i) +
∑
pi∈Π(V )
k<pi(i)<|V |−k−1
MC(Cpi(i), i)
|V |!
We will estimate the second term of Equation 5 by rewriting it as an average
over the (|V |−2|k|−2)|V |!|V | permutations pi such that pi ∈ Π(V ), k < pi(i) < |V |−k:
|V |
(|V | − 2|k| − 2)|V |!
∑
pi∈Π(V )
k<pi(i)<|V |−k−1
( |V | − 2|k| − 2
|V |
)
MC(Cpi(i), i)), (5)
leading us to the estimate with random permutation pi:
1
m
m∑
i=1
( |V | − 2|k| − 2
|V |
)
MC(Cpi(i), i),
Sampling Connected Coalitions: Let C(i) = {C : i ∈ C and {C} = K(C)}
be the number of coalitions such that i ∈ C and C is connected and let N (i) =
{C : i ∈ N(C) and {C} = K(C)} be the number of coalitions such that i ∈
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Algorithm 2: Our algorithm: sampling permutations & exact computa-
tions to approximate the Myerson value
Input: Graph: G = (V,E), Function: ν : C(G)→ R, Number Samples:
m, Number exact computations: Ex
1 MV ← array of size |V | filled with 0;
2 s← some node in V ;
3 for i← 1 to m do
4 //uniform distribution from the set [Ex+ 1, |V | − Ex− 2];
5 k ← UNIFORM DIST (Ex+ 1, |V | − Ex− 2);
6 S ← random coalition of size k from the set V \ s;
7 for v ∈ V do
8 C ← Sv↔s;
9 MV [v]←MV [v] + νG(C ∪ {v})− νG(C);
10 for v ∈ V do
11 MV [v]←
(
|V |−2Ex−2
|V |
)
MV [v]
m ;
12 E ← {C : C ⊂ V and |C| ≤ Ex};
13 for C ∈ E do
14 val C ← νG(C);
15 for v ∈ (V \ C) do
16 MV [v]←MV [v] + |C|!(|V |−|C|−1)!|V |! (νG(C ∪ {v})− val C);
17 C ← V \ C;
18 val C ← νG(C);
19 for v ∈ C do
20 MV [v]←MV [v] + (|C|−1)!(|V |−|C|)!|V |! (val C − νG(C \ {v});
21 Output: MV ;
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N(C) and C is connected. We will now consider the following formula for the
Myerson value (due to [20]):
MVi(ν) = MV
+
i (ν)−MV −i (ν), (6)
where:
MV +i (ν) =
∑
C∈C(i)
(|C| − 1)!|N(C)|!
(|C|+ |N(C)|)! ν(C),
MV −i (ν) =
∑
C∈N (i)
(|C|)!|N(C)− 1|!
(|C|+ |N(C)|)! ν(C). (7)
We can also rewrite these equations as averages over a set of elements:
MV +i (ν) =
1
|C(i)|
∑
C∈C(i)
|C(i)| (|C| − 1)!|N(C)|!
(|C|+ |N(C)|)! ν(C),
MV −i (ν) = −
1
|N (i)|
∑
C∈N (i)
|N (i)| (|C|)!|N(C)− 1|!
(|C|+ |N(C)|)! ν(C).
Drawing a random connected coalition from the set of connected coalitions, we
can attempt to estimate MV −i (ν) and MV
+
i (ν), however we do not know the
values of |C(i)| and |N (i)|. If we sample random coalitions (not only those that
are connected) with uniform probability, we will note that we can estimate these
values. Let m be the number of samples, and m(Ci) be the number of samples
such that they fall in the set C(i), and m(Ni) be the number of samples such that
they fall into the set N (i). Notice that m(Ci)m is an estimate of the percentage
of all coalitions that fall into the set C(i) (and similarly for N (i)). The total
number of non-empty coalitions is 2|V | − 1, and hence (2|V | − 1)m(Ci)m gives us
an estimate of |C(i)|. We can then use the following formula as an estimate of
MV +i (ν) (and similarly for MV
−
i (ν)):
M̂V
+
i (ν) =
1
m(Ci)
∑
C∈C(i)
(2|V | − 1)m(Ci)
m
(|C| − 1)!|N(C)|!
(|C|+ |N(C)|)! ν(C)
=
1
m
∑
C=K(C),i∈C
(2|V | − 1)(|C| − 1)!|N(C)|!
(|C|+ |N(C)|)! ν(C) (8)
Note how m(Ci) disappears from the equation. An alternative way of looking
at things is to consider Equations 7 as an average over all non-empty coalitions
(of which there are 2|V | − 1), where disconnected coalitions have value 0. This
serves as an equivalent interpretation of Equation 8, since the average is now
over m sampled coalitions.
4 Theoretical Analysis
As has become the standard in the literature [10, 3], we will use one of Hoeffd-
ing’s theorems in order to achieve a number of samples that will result in a prob-
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Algorithm 3: Sampling connected coalitions for computing the Myerson
value
Input: Graph: G = (V,E), Function: ν : 2|V | → R, Number Samples: m
1 MV ← array of size |V | filled with 0;
2 MV − ← array of size |V | filled with 0;
3 MV + ← array of size |V | filled with 0;
4 for i← 1 to m do
5 C ← random, non-empty coalition;
6 if C is connected then
7 for v ∈ C do
8 MV +[v]←MV +[v] + (|C|−1)!|N(C)|!(|C|+|N(C)|)! ν(C);
9 for v ∈ N(C) do
10 MV −[v]←MV −[v] |C|!(|N(C)|−1)!(|C|+|N(C)|)! ν(C);
11 for v ∈ V do
12 MV [v]← 2|V |−1m (MV +[v]−MV −[v]);
13 Output: MV ;
ably approximately correct approximation. That is, we are looking for the num-
ber of samples, m, that will result in the following: Pr(|MVi(ν) − M̂V i(ν)| ≥
) ≤ δ.
Hoeffding’s Theorem 2 [9] will allow us to bound the error within some
probability by knowing the minimum and maximum value of the marginal con-
tribution of nodes. The theorem implies3 that if S =
∑m
i=1X, where X is
a random variable with range (i.e., the difference between the maximum and
minimum values) r, then for  > 0 we have:
Pr(|φ− φˆ| ≥ ) ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2m
22
mr2
)
. (9)
In our context, X will be based on the marginal contributions of a player (with
some modifications, depending on the sampling method). This leads to the
following inequality:
2 exp(−2m
2
r2
) ≤ δ ⇒ −2m
2
r2
≤ ln(δ
2
) ⇒ m ≥ − ln(
δ
2 )r
2
22
. (10)
Note, however, that MC(v, C) is based on νG, and not ν, so simply knowing
the range of the marginal contributions for ν will not suffice. In fact, the range
for νG can strongly depend on the graph. Let us look at the following example:
Example 1 Consider Figure 1 and the characteristic function ν(C) = |C|2.
We see that the minimum marginal contribution of a node is 1, whereas the
maximum contribution is 52 − 42 = 9. However, what if we consider νG? The
contribution of node v1 to {v2, v3, v4, v5} is equal to 52 − 4 = 21. Because it is
central in the graph, v1 is able to make a much larger contribution.
3Similarly to [10], we have provided a less general version, more suited to our context.
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v1 v2v3
v4
v5
Figure 1: A sample star network
If ν takes only positive or negative values, we can use a conservative approxi-
mation of the range: r = maxC⊆V (|ν(C)|). In general, however, this might be a
more difficult. Consider, for example, Figure 1 with the characteristic function:
ν(C) =

1 |C| = 1
−1 |C| > 1
0 otherwise
In this case, v1 makes a contribution of −5 to {v2, v3, v4, v5}. A conservative
bound for r that is easy to calculate is as follows: r = |V |maxC⊆V (|ν(C)|). We
will now move on to each of our three sampling methods.
Sampling Permutations: In Algorithm 1, our estimate for the Myerson value
of node v is based on the following:
∑m
i=1
MC(v,C)
m , where C is a random vari-
able representing a random coalition with a probability distribution such that
Pr(|C| = k) = 1|V | for 0 ≤ k ≤ |V | − 1, and coalitions of the same size are
equally probable. This leads to the following number of samples:
m ≥ − ln(
δ
2 )(
r
m )
2
22
⇒ m ≥ 3
√
− ln(
δ
2 )r
2
22
.
Hybrid Algorithm: Here, we will see the advantage of Algorithm 2. The
random variable that Algorithm 2 samples over is
∑m
i=1
( |V |−2Ex−2
|V |
)MC(v,C)
m .
Note that now C is a random variable that ranges over coalitions of size k such
that Ex < k < |V | − Ex − 1. This means that especially for superadditive,
subadditive, supermodular and submodular functions, the extreme values are
computed exactly, and the range is further reduced. A conservative bound is r =
maxC⊆V,Ex<|C|<|V |−Ex−1(|ν(C)|) for positive or negative valued functions, or
r = |V |maxC⊆V,Ex<|C|<|V |−Ex−1(|ν(C)|) for any characteristic function. The
number of required samples is as follows:
m ≥ −
ln( δ2 )((
|V |−2Ex−2
|V | )
r
m )
2
22
⇒ m ≥
( |V | − 2Ex− 2
|V |
) 2
3
3
√
− ln(
δ
2 )r
2
22
.
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In particular, notice that with just Ex = 0 we compute exactly the contribution
of a player to only two coalitions, but decrease the required sample size by a
factor of ( 2|V | )
2
3 .
Sampling Connected Coalitions: The random variable for Algorithm 3 can
take on one of three values: 0, if C is not connected; 2
|V |−1
m
(|C|−1)!|N(C)|!
(|C|+|N(C)|)! ν(C), if
v ∈ C; and 2|V |−1m |C|!(|N(C)|−1)!(|C|+|N(C)|)! ν(C), if v ∈ N(C). The impact of (|C|−1)!|N(C)|!(|C|+|N(C)|)!
and |C|!(|N(C)−1|)!(|C|+|N(C)|)! is unpredictable, and depends strongly on the graph. The
maximum value that these fractions can take is 1|V | and the minimum is α =
(
|V |
2 )!(
|V |−1
2 )!
|V |! , impacting the range of the random variable. We can bound the
range as follows: r = maxC⊆V (|ν(C)|) + α|V | minC⊆V (|ν(C)|). The number of
required samples, then, is:
m ≥ (2|V | − 1) 23 3
√
− ln(
δ
2 )r
2
22
.
Although this bound may seem much worse than the other two algorithms,
this analysis does not take into account the fact that computing a sample in
Algorithm 3 is significantly less expensive than in the other algorithms. In the
next section, we will empirically evaluate the performance of the algorithms by
limiting their running time, which will help us evaluate their performance from
another perspective.
5 Empirical Analysis
We empirically test our algorithms on a broad spectrum of characteristic func-
tions and graphs. The following games are considered:
• Uniform random: ν(C) is sampled from a uniform distribution over
(0, |C|);
• Uniform superadditive: ν(C) is sampled from a uniform distribution
over (κC , κC + maxGain), where κC = maxS,T⊆C,S∪T=C,S∩T=∅(ν(S) +
ν(T )) and maxGain = 3 is a constant representing the degree of superad-
ditivity;
• Uniform random monotone submodular: ν(C) is sampled from a
uniform distribution over (0,maxSingleton) if |C| = 1, and from (λ, µ)
otherwise, where λ the minimal value that ensures monotonicity and µ is
the maximal value that ensures submodularity.
We study each type of game for the following graph4:
• Preferential Attachment: Preferential Attachment graph generation
model proposed by Baraba´si and Albert [4] with m0 initially connected
4results for more graphs, including Erdos-Renyi graphs, are available in the appendix
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nodes and m being the degree that a vertex has after joining. Graphs
obtained using this method have a power-law degree distribution, where
high degree nodes gain a high reward for their central position in the
network.
(a) Uniform random (b) Superadditive random (c) Submodular random
Figure 2: Estimation error against the time for Preferential Attachment graph.
Due to computational restrictions, we evaluate our algorithms for |V | = 15.
For this graph size, it is still possible to generate a characteristic function and
compute the exact Myerson value of players relatively quickly. We define the
error of the estimated value as the sum for all players of absolute deviations
from the exact value.
6 Discussion
As expected, our hybrid Algorithm 2 performs significantly better than simple
Monte Carlo sampling in Algorithm 1. This is reflected both in the theoretical
and empirical analysis. In particular, computing the marginal contribution of
players to just two coalitions (the empty coalition, and the grand coalition
minus one player) already decreases the required number of samples by a factor
of 3
√
2
|V | . Although Algorithm 3 performs worse per sample than either of the
two previous algorithms, it must be kept in mind that computing samples for
this algorithm is faster. Nonetheless, even when given the same running time,
Algorithm 3 cannot compete.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have analysed both empirically and theoretically three5 algorithms for ap-
proximating the Myerson value. We have shown that our algorithm, Algorithm
5Algorithm 1 is a variation on a well-known approximation for the Shapley value
REFERENCES 13
2, achieves the best results, and improves upon the approximations of the Shap-
ley value in the literature. Future work may include different types of sampling
(i.e., sample only connected coalitions) or different approximation techniques
altogether. Moreover, approximation techniques have not yet been developed
for many solution concepts or for game-theoretic network centrality measures
that are inspired by Myerson’s graph-restricted games. In particular, the work
by [1, 2] seems well suited for this.
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Appendix
Additionally, we study the performance of our algorithms for the following
graphs:
• Cycle: a cycle of n vertices. A cycle is a simple example of a symmetric,
very sparse graph, where the fraction of connected coalitions is very small.
• Erdos and Renyi [7]: a random graph of n nodes, where the probability
of an edge between any two vertices is edgeProb. The graphs obtained
using this method has a symmetric degree distribution and relatively large
fraction of coalitions that are connected.
(a) Size valuation (b) Uniform random (c) Uniform superadditive
Figure 3: Estimation error against the number of iterations for a cycle graph.
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(a) Uniform random (b) Superadditive random (c) Submodular random
Figure 4: Estimation error against running time for Erdos-Renyi graph with
edgeProb = 0.4.
